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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

. WERNER KIEPE,
Plaintiff-Appellant
and Cross Respondent,
vs.

Ca.se No.
10310

; ELI D. LECHEMINANT,
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross Appellant

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF AND
BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Nature of the Case made by Appellant and with Appellant's statement of Disposition of the Case Made in
Lower Court.
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Respondent does not agree with all the Statement of Facts stated by Appellant and particularly
as to Appellant's statement of overcharges to customers made by Respondent. Were this appeal from
the final judgment, then that part of Appellant's
Statement of Facts pertaining to the case resulting
in the judgment entered on March 12, 1964 not herein objected to might be in order but the only record
of the case on which this appeal is taken is that made
subsequent to the judgment entered March 12, 1964.
To go behind this record is unimportant and simply
confuses the facts as to the real issue on this appeal.
Appellant states on pages 5 and 6 of his brief,
that from January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964,
the partners continued to operate the business in
the same manner as they had done prior to notice
of dissolution. In this we do not fully agree. The
fact as shown by the record is that while the partners continued on in the same office, appellant took
into his possession and under his control, the appraisal business and records, claiming those assets
as his own and not partnership assets and Appellant
conducted his own independent appraisal business.
He did not intend that Respondent participate in
the income, therefrom, while Respondent carried
on the mortgage loan and insurance business of the
partnership, from which Appellant expected to and
did at all times participate in the income, just as
he did prior to the dissolution of the partnership.
Appellant devoted the whole of his time to his appraisal business. The only question before the cm:rt
is what is the equitable basis under which the parties
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nperated for a period of thirteen months, from the
date of dissolution to the final breaking off date.
The attention of the court is directed to the fact
that this phase of the case was not made an issue
br the pleadings. The trial court retained jurisdiction, after having entered its judgment on the case,
at the request of counsel, to settle the controversy
which had arisen between the parties as to this thirteen month period of time when the parties could
not resolve their differences. The Order from which
the appeal is taken was initiated not by any pleadings but upon application of Respondent for an
Order to Show Cause why Appellant should not be
found in contempt of court for having failed to comply with the judgment of the court which was made
· and entered on March 12, 1964. At this hearing, on
Respondent's application, both parties initiated the
matter of accountings for the thirteen month period
subsequent to the date of dissolution.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AWARD OF $2,500.00 TO RESPONDENT BY THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9,
1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS OR
FINDINGS OF FACT.
As is heretofore stated, not only are there no
pleadings or findings to support this award under
the order appealed from as contended by Appellant,
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but there are no pleadings, findings and conclusions
to support that part of the order which appellant
is willing to have stand and to have enforced against
Respondent, that which benefits appellant, from
which respondent takes his cross-appeal, that part
of the judgment pertaining to salaries awarded to
Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen and charged
against partnership operation.
Appellant refers to the Order from which his
appeal is taken as "this part of the judgment." We
contend that this is not a part of the judgment but
it is simply collateral to and in aid of the final judgment, in enforcement of the judgment. If it is not
in enforcement of the judgment then the matters
considered by the court and on which the Order
appealed from was entered, was separate and apart
from, and collateral to those issues framed by the
pleadings and to those rights asserted in the action
proper, and therefore no findings and conclusions
were necessary. It is to be noted that the parties
waived findings and conclusions in the case proper.
That which brought the matter before the court was
as is heretofore stated, on application of respondent
for an Order to Show Cause why Appellant should
not be found in contempt for having failed to comply
with the judgment of the court.
The action is an equitable action, and contrary
to the argument of Appellant that the court heard
no evidence to support its order, the court did hear
evidence and had theretofore indicated to counsel
that it intended to award some compensation to Re-

for his having preserYed the mortgage loan
asset of the partnership, and having retained jurisdiction of the case at the request of both counsel the
case having been tried piece meal, exercised its equitable powers in entering its order allowing compensation to respondent for his services rendered. The
parties agreed to submit this phase of the case to
the court and to abide by its decision. Therefore an
appeal from the ruling is not in order, nor is the
order appealed from an appealable order.
~pondent

Appellant cannot come into a court of equity
and seek to avail himself of the benefits of that part
of an order beneficial to him and object to that part
of the order which is not beneficial to him, which it
is apparent appellant seeks to do, this especially when
· he is faced with the same omission, if there is an
omission, as that complained of. Here the court
awarded, and charged against the partnership in. come, the salary of a clerk whom respondent had
discharged and who had been rehired by appellant,
after respondent had stated to appellant that if he
reemployed the party discharged Appellant would
be required to pay her salary; and a clerk whom
appellant brought into his employment to learn the
ousiness, after dissolution, one who had never been
an employee of the partnership, none of this is supported by pleadings, findings or conclusions.
Respondent finds no fault with the authorities
cited and relied upon by appellant, but they are not
applicable in this case.
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Appellant points out the fact that the court
adopted the recommendation of Respondent in ordering that all income received by each party from
January 1, 1963 to February 1, 1964 is to be distributed in the same manner and as is provided by
the partnership agreement and as has heretofore
been received and distributed, and that neither partner will receive any compensation for services during this interim period. It is evident however that
when such recommendation was made by Respondent's counsel it was assuming that the partnership
agreement if invoked, would be invoked in all aspects. This would require the consent of Respondent to the employment of those not employed by
the partnership. Thus Respondent would be protected and would not be compelled to pay one-half
the salary of such employees. (See R. 83)
POINT II
THE ISSUE UPON WHICH THE AWARD
OF $2,500 TO THE RESPONDENT WAS MADE
BY THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964
WAS TRIED ON FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND
WAS ADJUDGED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT BY THE JUDGMENT OF MARCH 12, 1964,
WHICH JUDGMENT HAD BECOME FINAL
AND WAS RES ADJUDICATA OF SAID ISSUE
AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964.
Appellant bases this argument on the ground
that the a ward made by the court to respondent was

I
1

1
•
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an issue, it was not made an issue by any pleading
but was simply an announcement by a court of equity
in its arriving at a settlement of a dispute arising
after the court had rendered judgment, and after
counsel for the parties had requested that the court
retain jurisdiction of the case to settle the dispute.
It is evident that appellant would take advantage
of his having led respondent into believing that appellant's net income was considerably more than
appellant later showed his net income to be, and in
counsels in reliance on such representation and rec, ommending to the court that which he considered
afair division of income and expenses, which recommendation the court adopted. Respondent later found
when the true facts were made known, which facts
were much different from those represented by appellant, that not only would respondent sustain a
substantial loss from participating in any income of
appellant but Respondent would expose his income
to ridiculously high operation costs resulting in a
much different award than had been anticipated.
Appellant testified as follows:
Altogether I've had $28,825.00 of total
appraisal work finished so that my income for
1963 amounts to over $30,000.00, to Mr. LeCheminant's $8,900.00. This is the problem
we each have half of that 50-50. But I have
against that some $10,000 personal expenses
which I have paid. (R. 93)
Appellant did not deny having made such rep, resentation as is evidenced by the following testimony (R. 106, Vol. 2):
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~· Do you recalJ, Mr. Kiepe, in the trial
of this case the quest10n arose as to what you
you would estimate your income for 1963 and
January ?f '64, would be? An~ the exp~ndi
tures against that for the earnmg of it? If I
remember .correctly you sta~ed that it would
be approximately $28,000 income with expenditures of about $10,000 against that?
A. Well, I remember being asked the
question, and I did make some estimates, but
now I have the true and actual facts, item by
item.

In reliance on this representation, and assuming there would be approximately $20,000 go into
the partnership account through appellant's earnings, the above referred to recommendation was
made by respondent's counsel. It is evident that the
court considered there would be sufficient income
realized by respondent from appellant's earnings to
offset any additional award which the court had
therefore indicated it would make to respondent for
his services in preserving the assets of the partnership represented by the mortgage loan business. The
court realizing the inequity resulting, and to correct
this inequitable situation stated that as it had retained jurisdiction of the case it made the award of
the $2,500.00.
The evidence shows the difficulty responden,t
faced in compelling appellant to render an accounting of his earnings as ordered by the court, and in
having appellant, each time the matter was brought
before the court, furnishing a different account,
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finally forcing Respondent to obtain an Order To
Show Cause.
POINT III
THE AWARD OF $2,500 TO RESPONDENT
BY THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964
IS NOT ONLY NOT SUPPORTED BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT, BUT IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE GIVEN AT
THE HEARING OF FEBRUARY 13, 1964, AND
IS CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
This point is covered by respondent's argument
under Point II, with this additional statement. Appellant argues at page 26 of his brief that respondent
took care of the mortgage loan asset for many
years before 1963, but received no special compensation therefore in addition to his fees for making
loans and commissions on insurance written with
the loans. We point out however that respondent
was, during that period of time participating in income from the appraisal business of appellant of
which approximately 50 % went into partnership
income which was divided equally between the parties after the proportionate share of expenses had
been charged against this income. This operating
expense was agreed upon by the parties by their partnership agreement, that neither party would incur
expense against the partnership in excess of $10
without first obtaining the approval of the other
partner.
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Appellant argues that the amount of time respondent devoted to the preservation of the mortgage
loan business did not justify the award made by
the court. The court having heard the evidence concluded that respondent had earned the amount
awarded to respondent. As to the contention that
the insurance company whose money was being
loaned by the partnership severely reprimanded respondent for the manner in which their business was
conducted is not borne out by the record when that
part of the record containing the testimony of respondent in explaining the situation is considered.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF A BONUS OF $535 TO
EACH OF THE PARTIES IN THE JUDGMENT
OF NOVEMBER 9, 1964 IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY PLEADINGS OR FINDINGS OF FACT, NOR
BY ANY EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE.
This point is predicated entirely upon an accounting principal which the court considered. Appellant had, according to his accounting submitted,
received his revised bonuses over and above the 50%
awarded in the original judgment and the court,
in order to place both parties on the same bonus
basis awarded this item to Respondent.
POINT V
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT OF
NOVEMBER 9, 1964 WHICH READS: "THIS
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BRINGS TOTAL CREDITS TO WHICH DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED THE SUM OF $20,101.93, LESS REFUNDS OF $3,668.71 * * * RESULTS IN A NET BALANCE CREDIT TO
WHICH DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO $16,433.23 OUT OF THE CASH ON HAND OF $28,723.98 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF
FACT OR BY ANY EVIDENCE.
The same is true of this item as that item under
Point IV. This is arrived at out of the accounting
submitted not by Respondent but by Appellant. The
trial court being an accountant himself concluded
this was a correct interpretation of the account.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
OF MARCH 12, 1964.
Appellant is most inconsistent in his position
on the whole of this case, in arguing under Point II
that the award of $2,500 made by the court is res
adjudicata, then under this point Appellant would
go back of the judgment which was entered on March
12, 1964, and he assigns as error the court's refusal
to correct that which appellant contends was a typographical mistake many months after the judgment
had been entered. True counsel for respondent did
state that if there was an error he would consent to
its being corrected, but after consulting with respondent it was determined that no error existed.
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The court did not refuse to correct an apparent error
as appellant would have this Honorable court believe.
That which the court did was to suggest to counsel if an error appeared to request the court to correct same. Respondent found no error as charged.
CROSS APPEAL OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an Order made and entered on November 9th, 1964 awarding Respondent
the sum of $2,500 for preserving the mortgage loan
assets of a partnership when respondent had asked
for $5,000; from the award under said order of compensation to Ruth Barlow and R. L. Christensen as
partnership expense; from a charge against respondent of $400 ( 1h of $800) fee charged by Appellant's accountant and in awarding Respondent
out of funds on hand the sum of $16,433.32 when
Respondent was entitled to an amount in excess of
said sum.
DISPOSITION OF CASE MADE
IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered an Order on November
9th, 1964 which provided among other things :
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1. That the Respondent be awarded $2,500.00
for "preserving the mortgage loan assets of the partnership."
2. That a bonus of $535.00 be awarded to each

of the parties.

3. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled
to total credits of $20,101.93, less refunds of $3,-

668.71.

4. Adjudging that the Respondent is entitled
to net credits of $16,443.22.
·
5. Adjudging that compensation paid to Ruth

Barlow and R. L. Christensen should be allowed as
partnership expense and be born equally by the partners.
6. Adjudging that the fee charged by Lawrence
S. Pinnock, Certified Public Accountant, should be
a partnership expense and borne equally by the
partners.
7. Awarding Respondent a net balance credit
of $16,433.22 out of cash on hand of $28, 723.90.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL
Cross Appellant seeks reversal of the following
portions of the Judgment or Order dated November
9, 1964 and judgment in his favor as follows, to-wit:
1. Awarding to respondent (cross appellant)
the sum of $5,000 for respondent's services in preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership.
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2. Adjudging that the compensation paid to
Ruth Barlow is not an expense of the partnership
and should be borne by appellant.
3. Adjudging that the compensation paid to R.
L. Christensen is not an expense of the partnership
and should be borne by appellant.
4. Adjudging that the fee paid Lawrence S.
Pinnock is not an expense of the partnership and
should be borne by appellant.
5. A warding to respondent out of the cash on
hand of the partnership, the sum of $22,098.22 being the sum of $16,433.22 awarded, plus one-half thr
compensation of Ruth Barlow of $2,550.00 or $1,275.00; one-half the compensation of R. L. Christensen of $2,970.00 or $1,485.00; one-half the fee paid
to Lawrence S. Pinnock of $800 or $400.00, and an
additional $2,500 for services in preserving the mortgage loan asset of the partnership.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cross Appellant and Cross Respondent entered
into a written partnership agreement the business
of which partnership commenced under said agreement on October 1, 1943 ( R 3), which provided
among other things that each partner should work
for the partnership on a basis of a salesman's commission, which should be 50 % of any commissions
accruing from the listing, sale, rental, or appraisal
of real estate, or from insurance commissions. That
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the partnership should be on a 50-50 basis as to costs
and profits. That disbursements from a joint checking account shall be made over the signature of both
partners, and that neither partner will incur an obligation in the name of the partnership in excess of
$10 without first obtaining the approval of the other
partner. That the agreement as to percentage of division of commissions was later orally amended which
is unimportant on this cross-appeal.
Cross Respondent served written notice of dissolution of the partnership upon Cross Appellant on
December 30, 1962, to become effective February 1,
1963. The partners continued to conduct business at
the same location, under the same firm name, with
some of the same employees, sharing the partnership office in the same manner after February 1,
, 1963 as before. Cross Appellant who had, prior to
dissolution for many years, managed the mortgage
loan business of the partnership, and who recognized
this business as an asset of the partnership, continued to manage this business of the partnership
as he had done previous to the dissolution, but Cross
Appellant conducted some little real estate and insurance business of his own. Cross Respondent dernted the whole of his time to the conducting of his
appraisal business, spending no time whatsoever in
the mortgage loan business of the partnership, this
relationship continued for a period of thirteen
months after February 1, 1963. The parties were unable to agree on a division of assets, and in the winding up of the partnership business, as a result Cross
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Respondent filed action against Cross-Appellant for
an accounting which resulted in a judgment entered
by the court on March 12, 1964. Neither party to the
action had by any pleading asked for a determination of the rights of the parties during the thirteen
month period subsequent to the cutting off date of
the partnership as of February 1, 1963. When the
parties were unable to agree on an equitable division
of income and expenses during this thirteen month
period the parties sought the aid of the court to
settle this controversy which the court did and which
resulted in the Order herein appealed from.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
CROSS APPELLANT THE SUM OF $5,000
WHICH WAS THE SUM ASKED BY CROSS APPELLANT FOR HIS EFFORTS AND SERVICE
DURING THE LAST THIRTEEN MONTHS IN
PRESERVING THE MORTGAGE LOAN ASSET
OF THE PARTNERSHIP.
It is evident from the testimony of Cross Appellant that at the time notice of dissolution of the
partnership was served on him there was nearly
seven million dollars of mortgage loan business handled by Cross Appellant for the partnership; that
there were some 600 accounts which required some
service every month in order to keep the accounts
current. This business was carried on by Cross Ap-

·l

,3
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pellant for the thirteen month period. As the mortgage loan account could have been cancelled by the
mortgage loan company because of the dissolution,
it was important that extra effort be made to service
these accounts in a creditable manner. As a result
of the service performed by Cross Appellant, this
asset which it is evident was a very valuable one was
preserved. Cross Appellant testified in detail to the
service rendered by him in preserving this asset,
(R 13-25, Vol. 2). Cross Respondent benefited
through these services of Cross Appellant and received his share of the profits from this operation
while at the same time Cross Respondent devoted
the whole of his time to his appraisal business.
The sum of $5,000 asked for by Cross Appel, !ant was most modest and should have been allowed
by the court.
The case might be likened to one where instead of Cross Respondent remaining in the same
office and conducting his private business therefrom, he takes a trip to Hawaii for a period of thirteen months during which time Cross Appellant
carries on the partnership business. We think Cross
Respondent would make no objection to an allowance by the court for Cross Appellant's services during that time. This case is no different. Or it is like
acase where Cross Respondent might have died and
have his interest pass to his estate, Cross Appellant
carries on the business. Such was the holding in the
case of Puffer v. Merton, 168 Wis. 366, 170 NW
, 368, 5 ALR 1288 involving a law partnership where
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one of the partners died and the firm had on hand
no contingent fee cases but all business held by it
was on the usual general retainer basis where its
clients could have dispensed with the services of
the firm. The court said:
Neither can it be said that the conducting to a conclusion of law business on hand
at the time of the death of a partner is simply
a winding up of the partnership. It is more
than that; it is a continuation of business
after the partnership has ceased to exist. Often
such continuation may require years of hard
work for completion. Hence it is not equitable
that the estate of a deceased partner which
has contributed nothing towards such work
should share in its compensation. Citing Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 1, 99 N.W. 473.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COMPENSATION PAID TO RUTH BARLOW AS A
PARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE B 0 RN E
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS. THIS
AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,550.00.
Cross Appellant discharged Ruth Barlow shortly before February 1, 1963, and after some period
of time Cross Respondent rehired her. It is evident
from the testimony in the record that Ruth Barlow
devoted the greater part of her time in reviewing
records and accounts in an effort to make a case out
against Cross Appellant. Her services were not
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needed by the partnership, neither were her services
required in the winding up of the business of the partnership. At the time Cross Respondent rehired this
party, Cross Appellant told Cross Respondent that
if he hired Ruth, Cross Respondent would be required to pay her salary, that Cross Appellant would
not, nor would he consent to the partnership paying
same. Even when Cross Appellant signed salary
checks for Ruth Barlow he advised Cross Respondent that he would look to the amount to come out of
and be charged to the account of Cross Respondent.
The evidence shows by Exhibit 22, that on February 5, 1963, Cross Appellant addressed a letter
to Cross Respondent which is in part as follows:
Now concerning Ruth. I will not agree to
increasing the overhead in any way during
the period of the partnership dissolution. I
told Ruth the day she went to the hospital of
the dissolution and that I would call her as
soon as this problem was resolved. At the present time we do not need more than a part time
girl. Linda is doing in a half day all the work
done by Ruth in a full day. If you insist on
rehiring Ruth before the dissolution is complete you should pay her salary. I invoke the
terms of the partnership agreement on this
point.
If we apply the provisions of Section 48-1-27
UCA 1953 which is as follows:
PARTNERSHIP NOT TERMINATED BY
DISSOLUTION.
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. On dissolutio~ a part~ership is not tel'm1nated, but continues until the winding up
of partnership affairs is completed.
Cross Respondent had no right to reemploy Ruth
Barlow inasmuch as the provisions of the partnership agreement continued in force until dissolution
under the above quoted section.
The partnership agreement as to the right to
incur obligations by either partner on behalf of the
partnership provides that neither partner will incur
an obligation in the name of the partnership in excess of $10.00, without obtaining the approval of
the other partner.
If it should be contended that the partnership
agreement is not in force after dissolution and during the winding up period, then Cross Respondent
cannot claim this i tern as an expense inasmuch as
Cross Respondent had not shown in any respect that
Ruth Barlow's services were required in the winding
up process of the partnership, or to complete transactions begun but not finished as provided by Section 48-1-30 UCA 1953 which reads as follows:
Except as far as may be necessary to
wind up partnership affairs or to comple.te
transactions begun but not then finished, dis·
solution terminates all authority of any partner to act for the partnership.
Therefore Cross Respondent cut off all authority to employ Ruth Barlow or anyone else, unless
agreed to by Cross Appellant, by his having served
notice of dissolution on Cross Appellant.

'
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COMPENSATION PAID TOR. L. CHRISTENSEN AS
APARTNERSHIP EXPENSE TO BE BORNE
EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS. THIS ITEM
. AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF $2,970.00.

R. L. Christensen was never an employee of the
partnership. He was employed by Cross Respondent
subsequent to dissolution to learn the business. It
, is evident that Mr. Christensen did not take the place
· of another employee of the partnership and the record contains not a word of evidence that the services
of Mr. Christensen were necessary in the winding
up of the business of the partnership. Cross Respondent was never consulted nor did he at any time consent to the employment of Mr. Christensen.
For the same reasons as argued under Point II,
this charge against the partnership is not proper.
There are no pleadings or findings to support
either this award or that under Point II.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE
FEE OF LAWRENCE S. PINNOCK, CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT, AS A PARTNERSHIP
EX P E N S E, PAID FROM PARTNERSHIP
FUNDS AND BORNE EQUALLY BY THE PARTNERS. THIS ITEM AMOUNTS TO THE SUM OF
$800.00.
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After Cross Appellant had objected to several
accountings furnished to Cross Respondent, Cross
Respondent engaged the services of Mr. Pinnock to
examine accounts, not of the partnership, or of Cross
Appellant, but accounts, items of which reflected
the earnings of Cross Respondent during the thirteen month period subsequent to the February 1,
1963 date. Cross Appellant did not consent to, nor
did he agree at any time that he would pay any part
of the fee paid to Mr. Pinnock. For the same reasons
as relied upon under Points II and III this is not a
proper charge against the partnership.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT CROSS APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
RECEIVE THE SUM OF $16,433.22 OUT OF THE
CASH ON HAND OF $28,723.98.
This item results in the assumption that the
Cross Appeal of Cross Appellant will be favorable
to Cross Appellant on all points relied upon, in which
case the award to Cross Appellant should be $22,093.22 and not the sum of $16,433.22 awarded to
Cross Appellant by the Order appealed from.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent and Cross Appellant submits
that the law and the evidence requires:
That the Order appealed from by appellant be
affirmed except as to those Points on which Cross
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Appellant assigns as errors in the following particulars:
(a) That Cross Appellant be awarded the sum
' of $5,000 for services rendered by him in the preservation of the mortgage loan asset of the partnership.
(b) That the allowance of compensation paid
to Ruth Barlow as a partnership expense to be borne
equally by the partners be set aside.

1

(c) That the allowance of compensation paid
to R. L. Christensen as a partnership expense to be
: borne equally by the partners be set aside.
(d) That the allowance of fee of Lawrence S.
I Pinnock, as a partnership expense be set aside.
c) That the finding that Cross Appellant is
i entitled to receive the sum of $16,433.22 out of the
, cash on hand of $28, 723.98 be set aside, and that
. Cross Appellant be awarded the sum of $22,093.22
out of said sum.
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Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, BACKMAN
& CLARK,
1111 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent and Cross
Appellant

